Urbanities,
Vol. 3
·
No 2
·
November 2013
© 2013
Urbanities
47
A Short Conclusion
To conclude, we would like to stress two aspects that have surfaced in our study. First, the
case of the Messina Bridge can be seen as the result of an instrumental reasoning (central
government and corporate interests) in support of a modernist idea of development. Contrary
to that, the social reactions that we have studied represent an alternative born in the local
communities. As our theoretical framework suggests, this social movement established
advocacy coalitions and tried to engage other social actors in the counter-public sphere in
order to increase its resources (people, knowledge, money) for opposing actions. The RNP
proposed a different way to manage nature and the territories; however, the political scenario
in which they operated did not offer opportunities for them to influence the decision-making
process. Moreover, it seems clear that pressure on the local communities was compounded by
a rhetoric that offered an easy way to address what in this context is an urgent need: local
employment. Because of the impossibility of influencing the decision-making process into a
different development path, or because it was incapable of managing the against-the-Bridge
coalition and offer an extensive and attractive development perspective, the social movement
seemed destined to lose importance. However, the conflict regarding the Bridge continued in
a different way. In short, the RNP managed to change its catchwords and expand its influence
in the social context; also, an important part of the movement decided to enter the
institutionalized political arena. This strategy has contributed to delaying
the realization the
Bridge and, given the decision of the Monti Government, to bring to an end the social
opposition.
Of course, this case study has stressed the lack of participation by the Italian
governance in infrastructural policies, which leads us to the second aspect that we want to
underline; that is, the Italian regulations regarding ‘great infrastructures’. In 2009, the Italian
government adopted a special plan for the construction of great infrastructures linked to the
previous ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (literally, ‘Target Law’). This law defines a list of specific public
works (such as national roads, Bridges, energy plants, and so on) that are considered to be of
crucial importance for the development and the competitiveness of the country. In order to
promote the execution of these important works, this law establishes a special authorization
path, outside of the law regulating public contracts and procurements. In spite of the fact that
each of these infrastructures potentially involves many different stakeholders, this law does
not provide a specific form of involvement of those potentially affected and, in contradiction
with EU recommendations on public participation, it does not include any mandatory debates.
On the contrary, the legislation has cut down both the time for decision-making and the
mandatory assessment of the environmental impact of big facilities. It is not a coincidence
that the Ministry for Infrastructures and Transportation has played a leading role in this story,
while the Regional authorities have only submitted proposals without being capable of
exercising any right of veto over the government’s decisions.
The analysis that we have offered has, once again, revealed that the actors potentially
interested in a specific policy can be different from, and more numerous than, those identified
ex-ante. Some of them may emerge during the governance process and, in lacking a legitimate
