Urbanities,
Vol. 3
·
No 2
·
November 2013
© 2013
Urbanities
39
The starting point of many analyses is that: ‘[Italy] is lagging when compared with
other EU member states, because of the close relationship between the industrial system and
the insufficient presence of industrial infrastructure; a further expansion of the gap between
the two could lead to a loss of further competitiveness [...] in the case of infrastructure, the
risk is that the presence of a strong anomaly (South Italy) within an already abnormal
situation (our country) will make things worse, in this situation measures must be taken
without further delay in order to reverse the trend’ (Nuzzi 2007: 180).
The Regions involved – mostly Sicily – have supported the project together with the
Municipalities of Messina and Reggio Calabria. Yet, at local level, opinions change
frequently. During the demonstration ‘No TAV – No Bridge’ held in Messina on January 22
nd
2006,
5
Rocco Cassone (the Centre-left Mayor of Villa San Giovanni) stated, ‘From this day a
virtual Bridge has been erected between Southern Italy and the Susa Valley against the
building of structures which do not respond to real territorial needs’ (
Repubblica
, January
23
rd,
2006). In 2005, also the newly elected Mayor of Messina expressed his fierce opposition.
In spite of the opposition to the Bridge found among mayors, councilmen and town councils,
the opponents have not managed to provoke an inter-institutional conflict strong enough to
stop the attendant decision-making processes. This can be seen as testimony to the weakness
that marks the lack of permanent institutional coordination among these small local
administrations; it also suggests that, in this case, the key contrast is between public
institutions at the central level on one side, and movements and citizen associations on the
other.
It also seems clear that the weak support of local governments to the movement
against the Bridge and the absence of a negotiating space, did not offer a favourable ‘political
opportunity structure’ for the movement to put forward its position about the Bridge. This is a
first level of analysis, which, as highlighted in our theoretical framework, is key to understand
the context of action of the movement and its opportunities to affect Governmental decision.
However, in the last few years, many early environmental movements are trying to reach a
compromise with the Government. They have become complex organizations, engaged in a
variety of environmental problems, and the need to protect legitimate functions within the
political institutions has led to a substantial change in their opposition. Some activists of the
RNP have repeatedly stressed this transformation. As an RNP activist put it, ‘in the last few
years we have noted a significant decrease in interest regarding the Bridge issue by WWF,
Legambiente and Italia Nostra. This happened in concomitance with the election of the new
Centre-right government […] they do not invest in the opposition of the Bridge any more,
they only arrange some meetings, conferences and very small events […], compared with
what had been sponsored in the past, such as the initiatives of scientific research and
extensive local communication events.’
Today, the project of the Messina Bridge continues to pose unsolved problems and
difficulties regarding its realization, such as international economic flows versus local needs,
5
‘No TAV’ is a grassroots movement born in the 1990s in Susa Valley (Northern Italy) in order to
oppose the construction of the Alpine tunnel for the high-speed rail network.
