Urbanities,
Vol. 3
·
No 2
·
November 2013
© 2013
Urbanities
38
Government and the General Contractor for the construction of Bridge; he used his wide
political and financial network in the organization of the call for tenders (2005), the
stipulation of the agreement regulating the execution of the project and the management of the
Bridge. However, discussion between public institutions and local citizens did not happen,
nor was it contemplated.
The Infrastructure Plan of 2009, passed by the Centre-right government, re-launched
both the ‘Legge Obiettivo’ (the target law) and the so-called ‘Major Strategic Public Works’.
According to the law 443/2001, Major Strategic Public Works are ‘public and private
infrastructures and settlements of high national interest to be realized for modernizing and
developing the Nation’. In this context, the Bridge is cast as the symbol of a new
modernization process led by the central government, a sort of redemption offered to the
communities of Southern Italy, and as evidence of a far-sighted political class’ commitment to
development. The following quote is exemplary: ‘The goal of the Messina Bridge is to
increase significantly the provision of transportation, thus creating economic development
and occupational growth not only for Sicily and Calabria, but for the whole Southern Italy and
the Nation’ (Ministry for Infrastructures and Transportation, January 2010).
This rhetoric caused some of the first divisions among public opinion, and refreshed
widespread discussion on the concept of modernization, which for many scholars is
equivalent to the concept of destruction (see, for example, Pieroni 2000). On the other hand,
the supporters of the infrastructure see the protests as a nuisance. These demonstrations are
considered as the expression of an attitude that prevents economic growth, or rather as the
will of a fierce and blind minority. In the words of Norberto Bobbio, this is why ‘It is
impossible to create something new in Italy! When major public works are stopped for long
periods of time Italy will not be able to advance at the same rate as other countries!’ (Bobbio
2006: 126).
Officially, the building site for the biggest infrastructure connection in Europe is
ready. By 2010, the first, smaller building sites had also been prepared, and in some areas big
bores have been laid. In the meantime, local conflict seems to increase, which was particularly
the case when, in 2001, the project was considered to be impossible to stop.
4
It should be
noted that the frictions are between all the public institutions and the local citizens. The
dividing lines are pretty clear in these disputes. At the central government level, both the main
Right and Left political parties have claimed, on several occasions, the strategic importance of
the road and rail links. The EU, despite its fluctuating opinion, has supported the construction
of the Bridge. At a national level, this project is seen as a good example of the view of
development formulated by the Centre-right government. Even the Centre-left parties, though
using different words, have not minimized the economic and social impact of the
infrastructure. Moreover, the confederate trade unions are ‘in favour of the Bridge’ in view of
its employment impact. Finally, both the trade unions and government groups are legitimized
by a large part of the scientific economic debate.
4
In 2001, a few days before the elections won by Romano Prodi (Centre-left coalition), the contract
was signed with ‘Impregilo & Co.’. Impregilo is an Italian-based company headquartered in Milan and
the lead partner in the consortium for the Messina Bridge project.
