Urbanities,
Vol. 3
·
No 2
·
November 2013
© 2013
Urbanities
13
This decision opens a historical precedent because it is the result of pressure from various sectors
of civil society. This is particularly true in the case of Amazonas; the Pastoral of the Migrant,
which sheltered these immigrants at the border and in Manaus, demanded that the local
government take a stand on the chaotic situation in Tabatinga.
The granting of visas for humanitarian reasons by the CNIg meant an advance in national
migratory policy. In addition to being in harmony with the Brazilian government’s National
Human Rights Plan, it extends the possibilities for entering the country to other groups in similar
conditions. This is crucial given that situations of human rights violations are increasingly
frequent in the contemporary world.
Nevertheless, the new measures taken by the Brazilian government under Resolution 97
of January 13 2012, which limited the concession of work visas to 1,200 Haitians per year with
the possibility of renewal after five years, fell like a ‘bucket of cold water’ on the expectations of
the immigrants who were already in the country. That measure could prevent their family
members and others who were planning to emigrate from joining them in Brazil.
Those who arrived after January 12 were barred at the Amazonian borders and created an
atypical situation in the Brazilian scenario. It was the first time that there has been effective
control of the entrance of foreigners at these borders, contradicting the ‘humanitarian’ principles
that until then had guided the management of the migratory flow. Even more serious, this
measure criminalized without distinction all the immigrants who tried to enter the contry
expecting to obtain refugee status. Beyond the established quota, all of them would illegally
trespass the borders as common criminals. This governmental stand also revealed relics of a
migratory policy based on the ideology of the ‘National Security Law’ of the military period.
Then immigration was seen as a possible threat to the State and not as a contribution to the
economic and social development of people of all nationalities.
Paulo Sergio de Almeida, president of the National Immigration Council (CNIg), said that
the quota was not a ‘strait-jacket’, because Brazil was willing to increase the number of visas if
demand was greater than that stipulated by resolution 97. However, if the objective of that
resolution was to eliminate illegal immigration in the Amazonian area, it appears not to have
been completely successful. In fact, Haitians continued to enter over those borders during 2012
and 2013, raising questions about the difficulties in obtaining an entrance visa from the Brazilian
embassy in Port-au-Prince. If the demands imposed by the Brazilian government – that they
must be living in Haiti, have no criminal record, and pay a fee of US$ 200 – were not excessive,
why should Haitians risk submitting themselves to the ‘coyotes’ and being stopped at the border?
What can be observed in this case is that there is a confusion of legal competence and
conflicts between government agencies dealing with the regulation of the legal status of
foreigners in the country. Each agency interprets the law differently. For example, newly arriving
Haitians continue to receive the protocol for refugees on the Amazonian border, even after the
enactment of resolution 97. Aiming to fight the action of coyotes and irregular immigration, the
